The Dialogue Between Catholic "Neoconservatives" and Catholic "Cultural Radicals": Toward a New Horizon

-by Mark Lowery

Students of Catholic social thought, and all those interested in the relationship between the American experiment in ordered liberty and Christianity, will find the ongoing discussion between the Catholic neoconservatives and the Catholic cultural radicals (to use Russell Shaw's helpful term)[1] to be intellectually invigorating and of great practical import. In the Winter 1991 issue of *Communio* I summarized and commented on what I delineated as the first four stages of the debate. In the present article, I provide a summation of those four stages, and then a more extended commentary on what I have delineated as the fifth through ninth stages.

Alongside the summation and analysis, the essay has a bibliographical purpose. For those who wish to follow the debate through the original sources, I have grouped the key documents together for each of the stages in respective footnotes.

Stage 1: Schindler's Response to Weigel's Thesis[2]

The debate begins with David Schindler's response (1987) to George Weigel's claim (1986) that American culture is not at heart secularized and bourgeois despite certain tendencies in that direction. Schindler argues that American culture is pervasively secularized, rooted in Lockean individualism. While Schindler admits that the American ethos displays a certain spirit of generosity, he sharply distinguishes this American generosity, rooted in a Cartesian dualism that yields an ontology of extroversion, from a Catholic form of generosity/selflessness intrinsic to which is a more Thomistic ontologic of Incarnational introversion.

Stage 2: The Second Exchange (1987)[3]

Weigel emphasizes that the American founding has roots quite different from those that germinated in the ideology of the Jacobin wing of the French Revolution. As John Courtney Murray noted, medieval Christian political theory provides the deepest roots of the American experiment. Hence, there is not a pure atomism at work in America that would inevitably yield a contemporary bourgeois culture. The empirical evidence shows America to be deeply religious, despite the secular leanings of the "new knowledge class."

America's religiosity is not pure, but it is genuine and capable of maturing, able to bear a "Catholic Moment." Schindler notes that Weigel's defense of American religiosity's "openness to transcendence" is vague and avoids confronting America with a distinctly Catholic understanding of transcendence. In the exchange, the issue of religious freedom arises, with Weigel suggesting that Schindler reverts to a pre-*Dignitatis Humanae* monism, and Schindler emphasizing that the Catholic onto-logic that he proposes as a replacement for secular America must come without any coercion.

Stage 3: The Debate Continues in 30 Days[4]

The issue of religious liberty remains in the background. Schindler emphasizes that the Protestant understanding of nature and grace (which informs the American founding) is extrinsicist, yielding the extroverted American generosity that is at heart a form of selfishness, while Catholicism allows grace to transform nature, yielding a more integral generosity. Richard John Neuhaus, Weigel and Michael Novak focus on the idea that the Catholic tradition of the natural law (prescinding from grace and Revelation) is capable of transforming American society, hence the "Catholic Moment." Each side expresses profound frustration that the other is not really meeting its respective arguments.

Stage 4: Stalemate[5]

The frustration that manifested itself in stage 4 reaches a peak. Following a *Communio* piece by Robert Connor, which reiterated some key themes regarding the nature/grace relationship, a *Crisis* editorial lambasts its "cultural radical" opposition in a manner that appeared to bifurcate metaphysics and politics. Michael Novak then clarifies his "neoconservative" position by acknowledging the importance of correct theology but noting that such purity cannot be instantiated with perfection in the political order, given the sinfulness of mankind. ("Everything begins in mystique and ends in politics.")

Stage 5: Assessment by Lowery and Response[6]
and
Stage 6: Exchange of Novak and Schindler[7]

At first sight, these exchanges are indicative of a continued stalemate in regard to the relationship between Catholicism and the American project. Schindler continues to argue that the first principles of Catholicism are essentially incompatible with the first principles of the American founding--America cannot "participate" in a share of an integral Catholicism--while Weigel argues that *Dignitatis Humanae* and *Centesimus Annus* invite just such participation. In the exchange between Novak and Schindler, Novak tried to show that Schindler, especially given his positive remarks about

religious liberty, was more in harmony with the neoconservatives than he knew, but Schindler insists that an essential gap still remained.

A close look at this latest round of literature, however, is particularly revealing and, I believe, shows there to be much more promise in the debate than first meets the eye. A fruitful place to begin is the query Schindler poses toward the end of his response to me: "Why would working to persuade the culture at large of a different (Catholic) set of ontological principles, by prudent means consistent with the love that is the heart of such principles, violate the freedom required for consent?" (468-69).

Weigel would of course agree with the need and desirability of such persuasion, and Novak positively celebrates Schindler's acceptance of this cardinal principle of *Dignitatis Humanae*. But the central point to observe, I suggest, is that consent and its requisite freedom remain the fulcrum on which the public debate is carried out, and on which the case for an integrally Catholic understanding of reality can (and must) be made. And Schindler, as far as I can tell, wants something other than the essentially liberal notion of consent, with all its vulnerabilities, to become the fulcrum of a properly ordered society. He wants the Catholic onto-logic to be in that position, though he wants it to come about *through* the persuasive, not coercive, methods proper to our regime.

Schindler's opponents claim that it is virtually impossible somehow to make the Catholic onto-logic the fulcrum of a society built upon liberal institutions. Schindler tacitly admits the difficulty when he indicates that he wants to "leave open" the question of the means by which a Catholic-weighted society is to be achieved.

> . . . my concern from the beginning has been that Catholics become aware of the need to weight society in the direction of an ontology consistent with a Christian as distinct from liberal understanding of love. I explicitly left open the question of the *means* of that weighting (whether, for example, these means should be legal-constitutional, and in what sense) in the early articles, and attempted to address that question in my response to Mark Lowery. At no point did I suggest that coercion was the proper means.[8]

Novak faults him for not providing any thinking about the reshaping of basic institutions that would be required if such weighting were to be effected.[9]

In his essay on evangelization Schindler takes up this point again. After a lucid review of the idea of an integral Catholic onto-logic rooted in the Eucharistic Christ, Schindler raises the critical question for our purposes here:

> But an enormous problem still faces us. Suppose we grant on intrinsic theological grounds the warrant for an evangelization formed in Christian liturgy and sacrament. This leaves a profoundly difficult prudential question: to what extent can such an approach to evangelization be recommended in a society like America, with its pluralism of religions? Indeed, can such an

approach be reconciled with the Church's affirmation of religious freedom--for example, in Vatican Council II's *Dignitatis humanae*?[10]

Schindler adopts two lines of analysis. First, he notes that American "pluralism" is in fact a hidden monism, that of liberalism itself. Public practice and public discussion take place within the context of different variations (conservative, liberal, radical) on liberalism's primary theme: the autonomous individual.[11] Schindler invites proponents of liberalism to come clean in regard to this fundamental commitment. This first line of analysis serves to sharpen the question about reconciling an integral Catholicism with an affirmation of religious freedom.

Second, Schindler outlines several principles meant to answer directly the question as to how his approach to evangelization can be institutionally instantiated. While all these principles are valuable in and of themselves, it would seem, upon analysis, that they beg the very question at issue.

First, Schindler repeats a point from his earlier contributions to the discussion: both Eucharistic love and the principles of religious freedom found in *Dignitatis Humanae* are non-coercive. While this is true, it does not tell us much about how the Catholic onto-logic is to find its way into our very institutions. Hence it is very difficult to imagine how the American experiment can somehow move beyond what I have called a "participation" in Catholic truth. How can we move toward the integral Catholicism that Schindler desires? One would hope that Schindler's points would yield some concrete direction; the first, however, only deepens the question itself.

Second, Schindler then notes that many Christians, and he certainly has the neoconservatives in mind, call for the virtue of civility in the public square. Schindler says we must go much further: we must not just be civil, we must be holy:

> . . . the virtue of civility, when taken up by a Christian, must just so far be dynamically ordered to a concrete life of witness (*martyrion*) to the agapic, kenotic love revealed in Jesus Christ and realized in and through the Marian *fiat*. In a word, civility in a Christian does not and cannot signify a bourgeois lack of passion: it is not compatible with the dulled sensitivity to spiritual and physical malnutrition characteristic of comfortable consumers.[12]

Of course, Schindler is absolutely correct. But his invitation begs the question at hand: how does one, practically speaking, build the Catholic onto-logic into the very structures of a society built on religious freedom? All participants in the discussion would admit that individual Christians ought to bring more than mere civility to the public square. The more there are who bring an integral holiness into the public square, the more America will participate in Catholic truth. But such participation, however great, does not yield a society with that truth as its *institutional* fulcrum.

Last, Schindler notes that Christians bringing an integral Catholic vision into the public square cannot employ this-worldly criteria of success. Again, all participants in the debate would agree entirely with this point. But it begs the question at issue. One is left, then, admiring Schindler's commitment to the fullness of the Catholic faith, but still wondering how one could instantiate this faith into the very logic of the American experiment. It would seem that one cannot have a Catholic-weighted American society. The best one can do--and presently, in the wake of Marxist totalitarianism, it would appear to be the most prudent thing one can do--is to make plenty of room for individuals freely to embrace that logic. (This is what Novak refers to as the "empty shrine" at the heart of the American regime.) Hence, the claim in my initial article that there can be but a participatory relation between the American experiment and Catholicism. As Novak noted, "while it must be said that the presuppositions, ethos, moral habits, and way of life required for the smooth functioning of democratic and capitalist institutions are *not* a full expression of Christian (or Jewish) faith, nonetheless, they by no means exclude the exercise of full Christian (or Jewish) faith. . . . There is no radical contradiction between the two; nor a perfect identity, either."[13]

This is an opportune moment to call forth a central theme of Catholic social thought and make a proposal in regard to it. The full and pure manifestation of the Christian faith, an ultimate sublation of the worldly city into the city of God, the final harmony of the transcendent and immanent realms of being, is to be had only in the eschaton. All discussants would agree to this. Interestingly, this rich theme seems to have no convenient label (analogous to "subsidiarity," solidarity," "priority of labor over capital," and the like) and I wish to propose the term "eschatological principle." When used in the context of social issues, this term signifies the realization that we cannot micro-manage a quasi-utopian plan for human history. Such ideological efforts not only are idolatrous, they actually make history more miserable than before. Ironically, the best tool for the laity to use in its unique mission of improving the temporal order is the awareness of the eschatological principle--that they cannot make the temporal order perfect with just the right new idea and plan.

But back to the debate. Schindler challenges the notion of a participatory relationship between the American experiment and Catholicism, saying that participation is never innocent.[14] Although on the external level there appear to be congruencies between the American experiment and Catholicism, the underlying principles are diametrically opposed, since "an ontologic of selfishness rests not alongside but in the heart of America's voluntary generosity."[15]

But Schindler seems to have misconstrued a central portion of my argument regarding a participatory relationship between Catholicism and America. He notes that:

> . . . rather than say, strictly, that Christians should seek to identify a "part" (or "slice") of the culture in which they might participate, and reject or withdraw from the other "parts," it seems to me rather that Christians should participate in the whole of the culture and thus all of its parts.[16]

The argument about participation has not a thing to do with withdrawal from various parts of the culture. I take it for granted that all parties in the debate wish for Christians not to be sectarians. Rather, the argument about participation is as follows:

a) The fullest truth about reality subsists in the Catholic Church.

b) The American experiment, while by no means a mirror image of Catholic truth, is *compatible* with Catholic truth. This is especially so because, when working properly, it respects the essential dignity of the human person and allows all voices to be heard in the public conversation about precisely how to order our liberty.

c) Hence, the American experiment itself participates in some portion of the fullness of Catholic truth. (This is the part of the argument susceptible to the misunderstanding that Catholics should participate only in a portion of public life.)

d) Catholics are to bring the truth to bear on all aspects of the temporal order, thereby bringing the temporal order into ever closer alignment with Catholic truth, and increasing the participatory relationship between Catholicism and America.

Schindler's misunderstanding of the argument is, ironically, good news, for it is precisely this point regarding participation, properly understood, that can serve to unify the participants in the debate.

The very essence of the Catholic onto-logic bespeaks the embracing of truth wherever it is to be found--even if only in small degrees--be it in Buddhism or in the American regime. It goes without saying that these participations are not "innocent" and pure--but that is precisely why they are termed "participatory." It goes without saying that Catholics hope for a fuller embrace of the truth on the part of those who only weakly participate in it. And insofar as Schindler calls us to ever fuller participation, his project is right on the mark.

In sum, Schindler might reconsider his negative response to the idea of participation. Participation seems an essential principle for Catholics who wish both to remain integrally Catholic and also to be integrally involved in the public conversation in a regime premised on religious liberty. The real, and helpful, debate, it seems to me, should be precisely about the *degree* to which the American experiment participates in the Catholic onto-logic. And then, it is essential to work harmoniously in assisting the faithful in their proper task of bringing the truth more fully to bear within the temporal order.

The participants in the discussion, in the midst of their other points of argument, have addressed the question about the degree of America's

participation. The results are promising. Both Weigel and Novak have drawn readers' attention to their own hesitancies about the American experiment--hesitancies that can easily be drowned out by their enthusiasm for the same. George Weigel noted:

> Can the American experiment link together rights and obligations, individual liberty and the pursuit of the common good, as the Council fathers urge? Or is there a solvent built into the cultural foundations of the American experiment such that the teaching of *Dignitatis humanae* will inevitably be traduced to one of moral individualism and emotivism? I am less sure of the answer to this than some of my critics may think.[17]

Weigel goes on to link his dubiety to what has happened in modern America, where presently "elite libertinism has profoundly influenced the man and woman in the street"[18]

Michael Novak has also taken the occasion of this debate to highlight his own expressions of hesitancy.[19] Schindler's response was that Novak needs not only to recognize sin in liberal societies, but also needs to recognize the foundational structure or logic of sin,[20] or otherwise put, to recognize that liberal society is inherently sinful, based in a logic of selfishness. But this response begs the question, for Novak has already tried to show that liberal society cannot perfectly mirror the Catholic ethos but can nonetheless positively participate in it to some extent.

I might also draw attention to another statement of Novak that makes it quite evident that he is willing to think critically about the American experiment in the midst of his enthusiasm for the same:

> To be a Catholic is not to be "open" to the world in the sense of going along with the world. It is to be committed to God. And it is also to be in union with Peter. We live in a very rotten intellectual culture, at a very rotten time in history. At such a time, to be a Catholic in America is to be against the intellectual culture of our time, to be at odds with it, *and perhaps even to begin todoubt the legitimacy of the regime* (emphasis added).[21]

Furthermore, Novak devotes considerable attention to the vulnerabilities of the American project in his most recent book, *The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. He echoes a key theme of central importance to Schindler's analysis, the priority of "being" over "having."[22] While aware of the "moral rot" in our culture,[23] he notes that "we have a chance to mend our ways."[24] In a word, he is quite cognizant of a key theme of Schindler, namely that the Catholic Church must be countercultural. However, it is essential, according to Novak, that we not link our counterculturality to that of the "adversary class," lest we fall into "uncritical lockstep with a treacherous ally."[25]

Richard John Neuhaus echoes these themes in his book about *Centesimus Annus, Doing Well and Doing Good*, noting that "The Catholic Church is not a religiomoral cheering squad for capitalism's new world order."[26] Neuhaus, like Schindler, argues that we must bring more than civility to the public conversation, that "the long-term future of democratic and economic freedom requires that the logic of freedom be secured in the faith and piety of the Christian people."[27]

The ultimate example of the recent neoconservative willingness to speak critically of the culture is found in the *First Things* symposium "The End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation of Politics."[28] The basic thrust of the provocative symposium was that the judiciary has so usurped the will of the citizenry (expressed through the political process) that we must seriously question the very legitimacy of the present regime. The primary theme in the follow-up discussion was that the citizenry itself is in large part to blame. There remains, of course, a significant difference between this relatively new focus of the neoconservatives and the cultural radical position; there is no "strategic alliance" between them. For the cultural radical emphasis is not on the judiciary or the citizenry gone bad, but on the inherent flaws in both. Still, the symposium represents the beginnings of a kind of "tactical" alliance between the neoconservatives and the cultural radicals. Both groups are pondering what might be done in the midst of what could soon become or already is an illegitimate regime.

Perhaps the full impact of the neoconservative "shift" in the symposium is seen through the eyes of a critic with no sympathy whatsoever for that shift. Irwin Stelzer writes:

> [The outlook for the conservative movement] is brightened considerably by the denizens of *First Things* to come out of the closet and "fess up" to their immortal longings for a society that derives its legitimacy solely from their divinely informed approval. It has always seemed strange to me that neoconservatives, long aware that intimate relations with the totalitarian Left could only end in tears, should think they could live easily in close proximity to *First Things* conservatives who, in the end, share their hard-Left brethren's contempt for the democratic process. . . .Jewish intellectuals may be useful exponents of some of the positions of *First Things* Catholics, but they should not expect to be partners in a governing theocracy.[29]

Might Schindler reconsider his opposition to the neoconservatives in light of Stelzer's criticism?

In sum, Weigel, Novak and Neuhaus, and a host of other neoconservative thinkers have accentuated what might be termed not the inherent sinfulness of liberalism, but its inherent vulnerability. Schindler, interestingly, also speaks of America's ontological self-centeredness as making it "vulnerable" when it comes to difficult moral cases.[30] Can this not be a key point of rapprochement? That liberal society is vulnerable, not inherently evil? Can these scholars not

then engage in critical dialogue on the *degree* of that vulnerability, both sides in the service of the varied institutions and forces in our culture dedicated to improving the present state of the American experiment?[31]

Schindler might object that this self-centeredness is still *ontological*, which actually bespeaks not merely a vulnerability to decay but an impossibility of reform, barring a rearranging of the fulcrum of the regime. May I suggest an answer to this complaint, drawn from the heart of the Catholic moral tradition? Man is not inherently depraved, but is nonetheless vulnerable to sin due to concupiscence, so vulnerable that a realistic look at mankind's accomplishments actually makes us suspect, though ultimately we know better, that Luther was correct about man's total depravity. Can we not say something analogous about American culture? That however tempting it might be given its present state, to see America rooted in ideas that are inherently depraved, we can still admit (with John Paul II, it would seem) that liberal institutions have a capacity for the good even though, due to their vulnerability, they will invariably be admixed with error and some injustice? And to admit that these institutions can and ought always to work harder for a fuller participation in Catholic truth? And further, it seems that all may well admit, with Schindler, that some other regime might exist that might be less vulnerable, that might be more positively disposed to an integral, not just participatory, relation to the Catholic onto-logic. Perhaps in some other epoch, such a regime will emerge, and just as *Dignitatis Humanae* refocused certain key points of the received tradition on religious liberty, some later teaching will refocus certain key points of *Dignitatis Humanae*.[32] John Paul II appears to envision a future Christian society, but he prudentially recognizes the need to work within the context of liberal institutions on the way to that society. As Russell Hittinger has noted:

> Although we can only speculate about this, it might be that the Pope is making a bid to return to what he takes to be the original source of European unity--the religious vision of human nature--while at the same time endorsing liberal political structures to protect the recovery of that vision. We should take the Pope seriously when he says that religion is the key to culture. Whereas Pope Leo XIII never gave an inch on his understanding of the political *civitas*, John Paul does not compromise on his vision of a religious principle for cultural unity. The principle of individual rights against political majorities, the division of the organs of state power, and the warning about the welfare state are for this Pope things that need to be in place if the Church is to go about its mission of creating religiously centered cultures. He realizes that, even in Europe, the Catholicizing of the culture is a long-term project. Whatever inherent merits there are to liberal political institutions, they are (perhaps like the *Pax Romana*) instrumentally valuable to the Church.[33]

In a word, we are to work in, through, and by means of liberal institutions. Schindler wishes these institutions themselves to be infused with the Catholic onto-logic, but as shown above he is unable to demonstrate how this might be done without changing their very nature as liberal institutions. If we are to work within the context of *Dignitatis Humanae* and *Centesimus Annus,* it would seem that we must affirm the legitimacy of liberal institutions, while simultaneously denying a liberal ideology, that is, the notion that the individual is an atomistic and autonomous center of rights.

One could say that we can never make a "strategic alliance" with a worldly phenomenon (such as liberalism) but we can make a "tactical alliance" with it.[34] In a strategic alliance, a Christian embraces the entirety of some attractive worldy program, and then Christianity becomes a means to that end (no longer "mere" Christianity). Christians are prohibited from making strategic alliances with any worldly system, and such alliances violate the "eschatological principle." But a central part of Christians' (especially the laity's) vocation is to work in the temporal order. In striving always to align that order with the Good News of the Kingdom of God, they invariably will have to enter into tactical alliances with various worldy programs. In such alliances, one makes use of those aspects of cultural, political, and economic phenomena that are compatible with--that can participate in--the central principles of Catholic social thought. Neoconservatives are vulnerable to making strategic alliances, while cultural radicals are vulnerable to shunning tactical alliances.

Stage 7: Catholic World Report *Treats the Debate*[35]

In the interview with Schindler reprinted in *Catholic World Report* the debate takes on a somewhat new and dramatic cast, with particular attention paid to the situation of post-1989 Europe. Schindler notes that Western liberalism, with its inherent flaws, may be more threatening to human dignity than Communism was. Communism enslaved people in a rather explicit and visible way, but the consumerist and materialist way of life inherent in Western liberalism enslaves people in a subtle and hidden way, a more pernicious way.

Schindler qualifies his remarks carefully. He emphasizes that the Founders did not intend any such worldview, but that the inner logic of their experiment invariably led in that direction, especially in the wake of liberalized Protestantism. He also acknowledges that the neoconservatives are critical of American culture, but the problem is that they see this crisis as an aberration. For Schindler, the crisis is inextricably connected with the principles underlying American culture.

In reviewing these principles and their inherent flaws, Schindler reiterates the nature/grace argument, noting again that grace ends up as an extrinsic addition to the natural law principles of the culture rather than an intrinsic infusion into the natural order of life (Jefferson is cited as an example).[36] Of

course, this raises in the reader's mind the question of religious liberty: how can America somehow infuse grace into its very institutions, if things religious must be left institutionally neutral? Is it not the case that only individuals can develop an ever more dynamic interplay of nature and grace in their lives, thereby bringing a truly Catholic onto-logic to bear on contemporary American culture? Given this important question, the reader of the interview is happy to discover that Schindler is asked that very question.[37]

In reply, Schindler argues that there is to be no effort to coerce persons to accept a Catholic onto-logic. When he is pressed as to whether this begs the question, Schindler responds that American liberalism allows a marketplace of ideas from which one is supposedly free to choose one's own worldview. In fact, however, "the various competitors are allowed into this marketplace only on the condition that they subscribe to the liberal notion of freedom . . . The competitors are politically free to speak, of course; it is simply that no one will pay much attention to them unless they speak the language of liberalism. Otherwise they will be dismissed as sectarian . . . ."[38]

The neoconservatives, as noted, insist that alongside liberal political and economic systems a non-liberal cultural voice, especially a Catholic voice, can make itself heard. Schindler responds in the negative: the economic order and cultural-moral order are never so neatly separable. One might infer that Schindler believes that it is necessary to make quite a radical change in our liberal institutions. But as Novak reminds us in his editorial, Schindler has made it clear that he wishes no constitutional changes. Novak applauds Schindler for his effort to *infuse* those institutions with a specifically Catholic intentionality that would not coerce others.[39] Novak goes on to note that given sinful human nature, this infusion can never be perfect and utopian.

Schindler's interviewer presses him, then, in just the right way: "Are you trying to restore something that never existed, a mythical Christendom of the past?" Schindler's reply is that any effort to Christianize society cannot be done through juridical and political means. Such juridical ordering too easily yields--Schindler quotes Dawson here--a mere external conformity to Christian standards. We need "the birth of a true community which is neither an inorganic mass of individuals nor a mechanized organization of power, but a living spiritual order." According to Schindler, Dawson's view mirrors the *communio* ecclesiology of the Council "which implies a forming in and through the reality of the Church as Christic and Eucharistic love."[40] But one must continue to press the critical question: does this not require massive institutional readjustment, and if it does not, what is the basis for Schindler's criticism of neoconservativism? It would seem that both Schindler and the neoconservatives would applaud an institutional arrangement within which Catholics could participate fully in the public square and, however gradually, imbue America with their vision.

Perhaps part of the problem for Schindler is that the neoconservatives simply do not tend to use the *language* of this *communio* ecclesiology. They

say they applaud bringing an integral Catholicism to the public square, but the language they themselves use is, well, too "natural." If I am right about this, then there is room for rapprochement. Perhaps some neoconservatives are developing an aversion to this mode of speech precisely because they are irritated with Schindler. And perhaps Schindler refuses to come to grips with the flaws/contradictions in his analysis (as outlined above) because he is irritated with the neoconservatives.

He asks at the conclusion of the interview: "Where in neoconservative thought do we find a serious criticism of the consumerism and materialism of the West . . . ?" As noted above, it is fair to say that the neoconservatives do engage in such criticism. The difference seems to be one of degree or style, not of substance. Schindler goes further: "Where [in neoconservative thought] is sustained attention given to the contemplative, receptive, Marian dimension of the human person; to the culture-forming dimension of grace?" Again, the neoconservatives may not speak the identical language as Schindler, but they appear open to this language, and one can I think fairly hear the neoconservatives saying to Schindler "we need *you* to add that linguistic dimension to our efforts." Schindler would quickly accuse them of the very extrinsicism (of grace added to nature) of which he has spoken, asking for an infusion of grace into cultural institutions. But given the logical contradictions in Schindler's suggestion, as noted, perhaps this is not mere extrinsicism.

A number of letters on the debate appeared in a subsequent issue of *Catholic World Report*, Russell Hittinger's being the most instructive. He speaks from the vantage point of one who taught in Poland alongside neoconservatives in a summer Institutute on *Centesimus Annus*. He notes that the moral failure of our country was a persistent theme among the participants. Schindler's response to Hittinger is that he was not criticizing the Institute but the works of Novak. Be that as it may, Hittinger's point remains pertinent in light of the cultural radicals' overall position: Rather than patronizing Eastern Europeans, as Schindler's viewpoint seems to do, the neoconservatives offer nuanced and qualified advice about politics, economics, and culture to Eastern Europeans. Eastern Europeans are quite aware of America's moral difficulties, and the challenge is to develop constitutional democracies that avoid "moral suicide." Schindler's response on this point is somewhat ambiguous, for he notes that neoconservatives see America's dark side, but they see this as an aberration from the American founding rather than intrinsic to it. But Hittinger's point is that Eastern Europeans are quite aware of our moral bankruptcy and are capable of sorting things out for themselves.

Before turning to stage 8, let me remark upon the fascinating similarities between this debate and the debates that occurred among Catholic "conservatives" in the 1960s and 1970s. These debates are expertly documented and summarized by Patrick Allitt in his recent *Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America, 1950-1985*,[41] especially chapter 4, "Crises of the Late 1960s." Allitt documents how Catholics who

represented a solid front against Communism and Secularism gradually fragmented, largely over the question of concern to us here: the compatibility of Catholicism and the American experiment. Implicit in Allitt's historical analysis is that because of this fragmentation the Church lost a good part of its capacity to be a formidable player in the cultural struggles for at least several decades.

To summarize the way in which we are presently repeating that mistake, consider the following scenario. Imagine a triangle with neoconservatives, cultural radicals and liberationists at the respective endpoints. (By "liberationists" I mean revisionist theologians who believe the patriarchal Church must be liberated by Marxism, feminism, ecologism, multiculturalism, new-age-ism, or some combination thereof; ignoring the eschatological principle, they fall prey to an historicist imanentism.) 1) From a cultural radical point of view, both of the others treat the faith as a means to an end. a) Neoconservatives make a strategic alliance with liberal democracy, while b) liberationists make strategic alliances with various ideologies of the left.[42] 2) From a neoconservative view, both of the others forget the eschatological principle, implicitly or explicitly seeking a quasi-utopia. a) Cultural radicals seek some form of a Catholic utopia (Catholic monarchism, restorationism), while b) liberationists seek some form of a secular utopia (e.g., the multiculturalist utopia: if we could all just tolerate everyone and every thing--excepting those who do not share this view of tolerance--we would have a happy community of people with high self-esteem). 3) From a liberationist view, both of the others inhibit mankind's progress by remaining attached to the unjust patriarchal Magisterium of the Catholic Church, but the cultural radicals at least have a relatively proper interpetation of social thought, and hence can be partners in at least a tactical alliance.

Can we afford this fragmentation as we approach the year 2000? In our efforts to heed the Pope's call to evangelization might not all Catholics faithful to the Magisterium expend extraordinary effort to work together in charity for the common good, whatever their differences regarding strategies for pro-life work, methods for natural family planning and sex education, liturgical customs, or our specific concerns here? Can we, without a trace of "false irenicism," avoid a kind of theological and pastoral pusillanimity that too narrowly locates the legitimate parameters of what is authentically Catholic?

Stage 8: The Opposing Sides "Go Public"[43]

Fifteen scholars/editors signed the official statement "A Civilization of Love: the Pope's Call to the West." While their affiliations are given for identification only, the periodicals they represent are by and large the cultural radical voice (*Catholic Worker*, *Chesterton Review*, *New Oxford Review*, *Caelum et Terra*, *Communio*, to name a few). Schindler's own introduction to the statement reiterates key points already summarized. He pithily summarizes the point about Western institutions being worse than com-

munism: "People know they've lost their freedom when they've been run over by a tank. They are not so quick to notice the loss of freedom that comes from enervation of the soul and slavery to appetite."

Schindler also emphasizes the key text from *Centesimus Annus* that speaks of the need for a change in lifestyles (art. 52), a text that in many ways is indicative of the core themes of the debate. The text asks developed nations to make lifestyle changes that avoid wasting the environment and human resources. Richard John Neuhaus saw this as a "vestigial rhetorical fragment that somehow wandered into the text. . . notable chiefly for its incongruity with the argument the Pope is otherwise making." The statement itself uses this remark (without naming Neuhaus) as symptomatic of the inherent dangers of the neoconservative approach.

A neoconservative might interpret this test as a reminder that there is a constant obligation all of us have to make changes that are respectful of every type of resource, natural and human. This does not necessarily involve a challenge to liberal institutions. Rather, these institutions themselves must constantly attend to lifestyle changes. For instance, many communities have carefully developed programs for reducing waste, requiring the change of such habits as throwing out grass clippings and compost material, and many businesses find that respecting the environment helps their productivity. The more prosperous a nation becomes, the more it tends to respect the environment. The cultural radicals might well think the Pope has in mind changes of a different type, namely, a kind of redistribution of wealth. But, according to neoconservatives, redistributionism presupposes zero-sum economic games that do not reflect economic realities. Moreover, the recommendation might have to do with every individual's constant need to live a lifestyle more in conformity with the Gospel (more prayer, more fasting, more contributions to charity, etc.). But such changes cannot be institutionally mandated. Thus, the statement can be squared with the neoconservative approach. But even if it could not, it is important to note that not every statement in an encyclical need be given the assent of mind and will, and that even such assent to the encyclical as a whole is of a different type from the assent of faith due to dogmatic teachings and definitions (see *Lumen Gentium* 25). (Of course, an encyclical may contain a statement referring to an infallibly taught or defined teaching.) For instance, in *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* the Pope speaks of a population problem of crisis proportions that devastates nature and calls into doubt the very notion of progress, but this is at odds with the facts about population growth.[44] Many cultural radicals, faithful to Catholic teaching on procreation (key points of which are infallibly taught and echoed in various encyclicals), would tend to share in a critical skepticism toward population explosion arguments.

Stratford Caldecott's introduction to the statement "A Civilization of Love" notes the radical nature of its challenges. He is aware of "the temptation to spin out of control into a romantic utopianism," but makes it

clear that the signatories are not interested in any new ideology. Rather, the call is for a more profound analysis of the problems latent in the concepts and assumptions of the founding. Caldecott notes that the anthropology of liberalism is challenged by a truly Christian anthropology in which true freedom is founded on love, not autonomy. Americans might be quite altruistic, but this is not the same as Christian love.

Caldecott then makes two important points. First, this love is "capable of transforming the assumptions of liberal culture." This must be done in a social mode by challenging the "institutional forms, associated with consumerist capitalism." What could this mean but a challenge, on Caldecott's part, to the free market? Despite the fact that Schindler says he wishes no institutional changes, it would seem that Caldecott is being more consistent in admitting such a need.

Second, Caldecott notes that Christian love is also capable of integrating the most authentic values of liberal culture. But are these accidental values, or part and parcel of liberal culture? If the former, the point is gratuitous. If the latter, then liberal culture cannot be so anthropologically bereft as the cultural radicals suggest.

There was no official "counter-statement" from neoconservatives. But at about the same time as the cultural radical statement was promulgated, the "Catholic Campaign for America" held its first National Leadership Conference. Michael Novak's concluding address[45] reiterates key neo-conservative themes already sketched above. The ten principles of "public Catholicism" that Novak articulates challenge the cultural radicals' outlook not so much in what the radicals benignly affirm but in what they are careful to omit: a challenge to the very structures of the American experiment. Instead, the statement assumes that the culture itself is capable of positive transformation; the present difficulties are an aberration. Novak emphasizes fidelity to the Church, civility and humility in public discourse and action, and consistency in bringing the faith into every aspect of our lives, public and private, and thus he tacitly challenges the culture radicals' program.

Let us return for a moment to Caldecott's suggestion that institutional change is needed. I think, in light of the analysis thus far, it is fair to hold Schindler to such a conclusion. Periodicals like *New Oxford Review* and *The Chesterton Review* take such change quite seriously. The latter in a special issue contains papers from a Croatian conference challenging the wisdom of adopting American capitalism, offering the distributist tradition as an alternative.

Richard John Neuhaus comments on distributism in *First Things*.[46] He uses a delightful part of a letter of James K. Fitzpatrick, published in the *New Oxford Review*, as illustrative of the difficulties inherent in promoting distributism:

> Whenever I read Chesterton and Belloc, the imagery captures my imagination: small villages, self-employed craftsmen, religious schools, social life revolving around the local parsonage, evenings with a pint of ale in a cheery pub. And then I come back to earth. The goal of distributists is to use the state to limit unjust concentrations of wealth; their objective is to use the law to set the framework for a less materialist society, one where home and hearth and family count for more than the lounge-lizard life of the Trumps and certain stock market gurus. Well, it sounds great, but, who is going to be in charge of all this social engineering? Who is going to be in charge of what it means to be "excessively materialist?"

Neuhaus goes on to note that distributism is "poetry and preachment," but that "until the distributist 'ideal' engages the structures and practices of the world of economics chronicled by, say, the *Wall Street Journal*, it cannot help but seem vacuous and naive." In a way, this is an unfair challenge, for distributivism by its very nature would just not engage that world of economics. But that is just Neuhaus' actual point: since it cannot and would not so engage, it is not a live option--certainly not something to recommend to struggling Eastern European nations.

Rather, it is an option, let me suggest, for those who are convinced, in apocalyptic fashion, that Western Civilization is lost, and that the best we can do is form small "communities of virtue" in the hopes that the best of our civilization can be passed on to those who might survive the deluge. Those small communities might well build on the distributist ideal, but they would not really try to engage the whole society. They would not quite agree with the third principle of "public Catholicism:" to *engage* the present culture with the liberating power of our faith, offering substantive contributions to the public debate. Such engagement would be the equivalent of, to use a now common phrase, rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.

Let it be clearly noted that cultural radicals by no means uniformly see themselves in this light; many genuinely wish to engage the present culture. My point is that they must think carefully about the logic and prudence of their proposal, and recognize that *in certain respects* it leads toward a certain type of sectarianism. In many other respects it is not just compatible with the neoconservative position; it is a much needed leavening of that position. Hence, just as neoconservatives must allow the cultural radicals' critique to inform their own understanding of American culture (as I submit is already taking place), so too the cultural radicals should reconsider their strong aversion to the neoconservative cultural assessment.

If Catholics are to provide some semblance of a united voice in dealing with the perplexing problems of contemporary culture, they must work together much more closely, allowing legitimate differences to be productive rather than destructive. Consider this invitation from *Gaudium et Spes*, commenting on the role of the laity in bringing the light of the Gospel to bear on the temporal order:

> Yet it happens rather frequently, and legitimately so, that with equal sincerity some of the faithful will disagree with others on a given matter. Even against the intentions of the proponents, however, solutions proposed on one side or another may be easily confused by many people with the Gospel message. Hence it is necessary for people to remember that no one is allowed in the aforementioned situations to appropriate the Church's authority for his opinion. They should always try to enlighten one another through honest discussion preserving mutual charity and caring above all for the common good (#43).

Stage 9: A New Spirit of Cooperation

As noted above, the *New Oxford Review* has made numerous contributions concerning the issues involved in the debate, and generally has placed itself squarely in the camp of the cultural radicals. In his October 1996 editorial, Dale Vree speaks favorably of Bishop Fabian Bruskewitz's now well-known announcement regarding possible excommunications of those who persisted in their activity with groups clearly opposed to the Magisterium. This was "the shot heard round the world," and Vree concluded his editorial promising some news in the next issue about how the *New Oxford Review* could intensify its efforts and "magnify its witness to orthodoxy at this crucial juncture in Church history."

It was with great delight that I read the much anticipated editorial in the next issue. Dale Vree emphasized that the Catholic Church is in the midst of a new crisis and that certain issues that demanded critical attention in the past have somewhat subsided. Specifically:

> It has been a characteristic of Catholic social thought in this century to explore the possibilities of some "third way" beyond liberal capitalism and Maxism. As long as a second way existed (Marxism), it seemed plausible that there could be a third. But with the collapse of the second way, the search for a third way has become quixotic and quite academic. This is not to say liberal capitalism is beyond question. If you think it is, you haven't heeded the papal encyclicals. But the grand debate about economic "systems" is over, at least for the forseeable future. The only question left is whether a market economy should be more or less regulated, a question which can quickly become quite technical.

This is a remarkable statement. It implies that neoconservatives and cultural radicals certainly should continue to debate about the shape that liberal capitalism ought to take. But it more than implies that there must a be a deeper unity among us all so as to present a united front in meeting the challenges to the Church. And what might be the most significant challenge?

> . . . because the Church now seems to be in a state of open civil war, and because the voices of disgruntlement and dissent are becoming more and more brazen and are coming from the higher echelons of the hierarchy, the

> next pope, whoever he is, will have to deal with a mammoth crisis. The stage is set for a real showdown. . . . Consequently, we said [last month] that the NOR "would like to magnify its witness to orthodoxy at this critical juncture in Church history. . . ."

We all need to follow this example. For those who have been involved in the neoconservative/cultural radical debate, now is the time for rapprochement: There cannot be total agreement on all issues, but there should be a willingness to put aside unnecessary disagreements and antagonisms.[47]

Toward this end, I herein outline a series of propositions to which, upon reflection, discussion and further refinement, all parties in the discussion might assent in their mutual concern for the common good and the good of the Church:

a. While the Church respects the proper autonomy of the temporal order and never favors any one particular political regime in principle, the liberal state is *compatible*, in practice, with Catholicism, as articulated in *Dignitatis Humanae*.

b. The extent to which the liberal political order is a good setting for the Catholic faith is a legitimate matter for continued discussion. The "Catholic Moment" theory ought not be construed in such a way as to suggest that the liberal regime is necessarily the ideal home for the Catholic faith in this world, even if it is the best available home at the present time.

c. The liberal state is something of an indeterminate and, hence, vulnerable entity. While in its current American manifestation, it is less than promising, it contains a capacity for improvement. Liberal ideology need not accompany liberal institutions.

d. Concretely speaking, the liberal regime, for all its vulnerabilities, is the best political option currently available. This is not to say that the Church endorses it (a strategic alliance) as her favored choice of all conceivable political regimes, which would violate the Church's principle regarding the proper autonomy of the temporal order.

e. The liberal state in America will never totally harmonize with the richness of the Catholic onto-logic (nor could any temporal regime); still, the cultural dimension of a liberal regime (as well as the economic and political dimensions insofar as they are affected by the cultural dimension) can participate in that logic. While shunning a strategic alliance with liberalism, we can make varying kinds of tactical alliances with it.

f. The degree of that participation, and the ways in which such participation might be increased, is an important matter for continued discussion. Varying kinds of tactical alliances can and should exist side by side. Undoubtedly, a Protestant ethos pervades much of American life, but even that ethos can and does participate in Catholic truth, and can be nourished by contact with the Catholic tradition.

g. Catholics should strive to bring the fullness of their faith to their engagement in the temporal order, even though the temporal order never will

echo perfectly that fullness (the "eschatological principle" in Catholic social thought.)

h. Because that faith is so much under seige, we must be especially dedicated to work in harmony with one another, nourished by a theological and pastoral magnanimity within the parameters of the authentic Catholic faith.

The *Catholic Social Science Review* in its next issue will document forthcoming responses, which can be sent to the present author at: Department of Theology, University of Dallas, Irving, Texas 75062; Fax: 972.721.4007; Lowery@acad.udallas.edu

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Notes

1. Editorial, "Of the 'righteous' and the 'perfect,'" *National Catholic Register* (Dec. 25, 1994). The term should not be confused with what almost become the name for the Catholic Worker movement. As William D. Miller notes in *Dorothy Day: A Biography* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), 254: "The only problem was what to call the paper. Peter, who had taken no part in making it up, wanted to call it *The Catholic Radical*, but Dorothy chose the *Catholic Worker*. Peter deferred." (Thanks to Nicholas Lund-Malfese for the reference.) Still, the Catholic Worker movement has displayed many of the convictions of the "cultural radical" position as outlined in this article.

2. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, interview with Lucio Brunelli, *30 Giorni (*April 1986); George Weigel, "Is America Bourgeois?," *Crisis* (October 1986), 5-10. David Schindler, "Is America Bourgeois?," *Communio* (Fall, 1987), 262-290. An important background piece: Schindler, "Catholicity and the State of Contemporary Theology: the Need for an Onto-logic of Holiness," *Communio* 14 (Winter, 1987), 426-50.

3. Weigel, "Is America Bourgeois? A Response to David Schindler," *Communio* (Spring 1988), 77-91; Schindler, "Once Again: George Weigel, Catholicism and American Culture," *Communio* (Spring 1988), 92-120.

4. Schindler, "U.S. Catholicism: A 'Moment of Opportunity'?" *30 Days* (May, 1989), 57-60; Richard Neuhaus, George Weigel, and Michael Novak, "America is Not a Secular Society," *30 Days* (June 1989), 52-55; Schindler, "The One True American Religion," *30 Days* (June, 1989), 55-59.

5. Robert Connor, "Relation, the Thomistic *Esse*, and American Culture: Toward a Metaphysic of Sanctity," *Communio* (Fall 1990), 455-64; Editorial, *Crisis* (December, 1990), 5; Michael Novak, editorial, "Mystique and Politique," *Crisis* (May 1991), 2-3; Background article: Michael Novak, "Thomas Aquinas, The First Whig," *Crisis* (October 1990), 31-38; Background book: Peter Berger, ed., *The Capitalist Spirit: Toward a Religious Ethic of Wealth Creation* (San Francisco 1990). Contains essays by Novak, Weigel and Neuhaus.

6. Mark Lowery, "The Schindler/Weigel Debate: An Appraisal," *Communio* (Fall, 1991), 425-28. Weigel's response, pp. 439-49; Schindler's, pp. 450-72; An additional piece by Schindler in the same issue of *Communio*: "The Church's 'Worldly' Mission: Neoconservativism and American Culture" (365-97); in Schindler's response to Lowery he often alludes to this piece.

7. Michael Novak, "Schindler's Conversion: The Catholic Right Accepts Pluralism," *Communio* 19 (Spring, 1992), 145-63; Schindler, "Christology and the Church's 'Worldly' Mission: Response to Michael Novak," pp. 164-78; Background piece from Schindler: "Towards a Eucharistic Evangelization," *Communio* 19, #4 (Winter 1992), 549-75; Background piece from Novak: "Abandoned in a Toxic Culture," *Crisis* (December, 1992), 18.

8. "Response to Novak," p. 172.

9. "Schindler's Conversion," p. 158.

10. "Towards a Eucharistic Evangelization,"p. 570.

11. See Thomas Storck,"The Superficiality of 'Left' and "Right'," *New Oxford Review* (October, 1992), 8-12, at 10. See also the twin article of J. Budziszewski, "The Problem with Liberalism," *First Things* 61 (March 1996), 20-26, and "The Problem with Conservatism," *First Things* 62 (April 1996), 38-44.

12. Ibid., p. 974.

13. "Schindler's Conversion," p. 160.

14. "Response to Mark Lowery," p. 453.

15. Ibid., p. 452.

16. Schindler's Response, pp. 453-54.

17. Weigel's Response, p. 445.

18. Ibid., pp. 446-47

19. See "Schindler's Conversion," pp. 150-51, and 155-56.

20. "Response to Novak," p. 174.

21. "Abandoned in a Toxic Culture," p. 18. The question of legitimacy is fully unleashed in a *First Things* symposium, discussed below, "The End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation of Politics," (November 1996, with replies in January 1997).

22. New York: Macmillan, 1993, p. 204.

23. Ibid., p. 205.

24. Ibid., p. 209.

25. Ibid., p. 216.

26. *Doing Well* (New York: Doubleday, 1992), p. 58.

27. Ibid., p. 60.

28. November 1996, with correspondence and replies in January 1997, and correspondence in February 1997. Also see the follow-up symposium in *Commentary* (February 1997), 14-43. All this and more has been published by Spence Publishing Co.

29. *Commentary, op. cit.*, p. 39.

30. "Response to Novak," pp. 174-75.

31. The *First Things* Symposium "The End of Democracy?" noted above and the ensuing discussion would seem to be a prime example of such continued dialogue.

32. In some sense *Centesimus Annus* has already advanced the argument, not by eliminating any teacings of *Dignitatis Humanae*, but by being much more sober about the vulnerabilities of democratic regimes. See chapter V, "State and Culture," with particular attention to article 46.

33. "The Pope and the Liberal State," *First Things* [December, 1992], 40.

34. I found these useful terms in J. Budziszewski, "The Problem with Liberalism," *First Things* 61 (March 1996), 20-26, at 20.

35. "The Culture of Love" (Interview with Schindler), *Catholic World Report* (October 1994), 42-49, originally published in the Slovenian edition of *Communio* (Summer 1994); Letters in response to the Schindler interview, with a response from Schindler, *Catholic World Report* (December 1994), 58-61; Reprint of the preface to the Polish edition of Michael Novak's *Catholic Social Thought and Liberal Institutions* (W Drodze, 1993), *Catholic World Report* (January 1995), 56-58; Michael Novak, Editorial, "The Civilization of Love, Yes, but Not a Utopia," *Crisis* (January 1995), 6-7.

36. A note on the nature/grace relation: Schindler argues that the Protestant understanding of grace is one in which grace fails to penetrate nature; grace remains added on to nature due to the classical Protestant view of man's depravity and the imputed aspect of grace covering depraved nature (hence, *simul iustus et peccator*). But there is another extrinsicism, a Catholic type, found in the scholastic tradition following the Reformation. This extrinsicism tended to deny the full effects of the Fall, holding that grace was lost but nature remained largely intact. Then, with the Redemption grace gets extrinsically added to a still-intact nature. A more

mature Catholic view, recovered by various theological movements of this century and to which Schindler is heir, rejects both extrinsicisms and sees grace as infusing nature. However, it is important to note that "nature" is still an important category in Catholic thought: grace may envelop nature, but does not extinguish it. Nature can be "pulled out" on a temporary basis from its context within grace, due to the fact that a portion (a slice) of the full truth can be known by unaided reason. Catholic forms of extrinsicism took this "slice" too far, giving nature an integrity of its own apart from grace. But the other direction, allowing grace to eclipse nature, actually falls into the Protestant extrinsicist error though upon very different grounds: rather than grace covering a depraved nature, thereby making nature an indecent category, grace envelops nature so much that nature is extinguished. Ironically, it is this "Protestant extrinsicism (with a Catholic grounding)" of which Schindler must be cautious. By slipping toward it, he may be rejecting the very item he wishes to support. So vehemently wanting to allow the infusion of grace into nature, he allows grace to eclipse nature--exactly the flaw, albeit by a different route, of classical Protestant anthropology.

37. "The Culture of Love," *Catholic World Report,* p. 47.

38. Ibid.

39. "The Civilization of Love, Yes, but Not a Utopia," p. 6.

40. "The Culture of Love," p. 48.

41. Ithaca and London: Cornell, 1993.

42. See Schindler, "The Culture of Love," *Catholic World Report* (October 1994), p. 49: ". . . the neoconservatives share with persons on the so-called left, like Richard McBrien or Rosemary Radford Reuther, some of the main presuppositions of liberalism....Catholics who follow the neoconservatives in fact end up, however unintentionally, assisting the [progressives] in importing into Catholicism the liberal presuppositions which lie at the (logical) source of the current cultural crisis."

43. Statement, signed by 15 individuals, many connected to various journals and periodicals: "A Civilization of Love: the Pope's Call to the West," *Communio* (Fall, 1994), 503, with introductions by David Schindler, pp. 497-99, and Stratford Caldecott, pp. 500-502. While no similar statement emanated from the Neoconservatives, the "Catholic Campaign for America," with, it can be argued, neoconservative leanings, was launched in 1994. Its first National Leadership Conference was held in October 1994, with the concluding address given by Michael Novak and published in *Crisis* (December 1994), 4-7. On page 7 are reprinted the Campaign's 10 "Principles of 'Public Catholicism'." Also see: Russell Shaw, editorial, "Of the 'righteous' and the 'perfect,'" *National Catholic Register* (Dec. 25, 1994); Richard John Neuhaus, editorial comments on distributism, in *First Things* (April, 1995, pp. 60-61); special Issue on Distributism, *The Chesterton Review*, 1995; Matthew L. Lamb, "Modernism and Americanism Revisited Dialectically: A Challenge for Civilization," *Communio* (Winter, 1994), 631-62; David L. Schindler, "Christological Aesthetics and *Evangelium Vitae*: Toward a Definition of Liberalism," *Communio* (Summer, 1995), 193-224; David L. Schindler, "Economics and the Civilization of Love," *The Chesterton Review* 20 (May-August 1994), 189-211; Matthew Habiger, O.S.B., Norman Kurland, and John H. Miller, C.S.C., Editorial, *Social Justice Review* (Jan.-Feb. 1995), 3-4.

44. See Julian Simon, "Too Few People? Too Many Trees?" *Crisis* (February 1991), 19-22, to give one popular source that deals with *Sollicitudo.*

45. *Crisis* (December 1994), 4-7 On page 7 are reprinted the Campaign's 10 "Principles of 'Public Catholicism'."

46. April, 1995, pp. 60-61.

47. There is bound to be some continued heated discussion in the wake of David Schindler's new book, *Heart of the World, Center of the Church* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996). "Stage 10" of the debate, purposefully left out of this article as it is still in progress, would include a review discussion of the book and the varied reviews of it.